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Abstract In 2005, competition was introduced in part of
the hospital market in the Netherlands. Using a unique
dataset of transactions and list prices between hospitals and
insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the inﬂu-
ence of buyer and seller concentration on the negotiated
prices. First, we use a traditional structure–conduct–perfor-
mance model (SCP-model) along the lines of Melnick et al.
(J HealthEcon 11(3): 217–233, 1992) to estimate the effects
of buyer and seller concentration on price–cost margins.
Second, we model the interaction between hospitals and
insurers in the context of a generalized bargaining model
similartoBrooksetal.(JHealthEcon16:417–434,1997).In
the SCP-model, we ﬁnd that the market shares of hospitals
(insurers) have a signiﬁcantly positive (negative) impact on
the hospital price–cost margin. In the bargaining model, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect of insurer concentration,
but no signiﬁcant effect of hospital concentration. In both
models, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of idiosyncratic effects
on the market outcomes. This is consistent with the fact that
theDutchhospitalsectorisnotyetinalong-runequilibrium.
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Introduction
Until very recently, cost containment was the major issue in
theinstitutionaldesigninthehealthcaresector,Schut[33].In
recent years, many countries like Netherlands and Germany
have started to increase price competition for hospital ser-
vices. In 2005, competition has been introduced in some
segments in the Dutch health care sector (for example, some
parts of the hospital care and physiotherapy). The Dutch
government is also planning to introduce more incentive-
based mechanisms in the currently regulated domain.
We investigate the effects of buyer and seller concentra-
tiononthepriceoftheunregulatedpartoftheDutchhospital
care in 2005 and 2006. We estimate two models describing
theinteractionbetweenhospitalsandinsurersindetermining
the negotiated prices. In the ﬁrst model, we estimate the
price–cost margin as a function of the Herﬁndahl–Hirsch-
mann Indices (HHIs) and the market shares of hospitals and
insurers. In the second model, we use a bargaining model to
describe how the gains from trade are divided between
hospitals and insurers. For that purpose, we regress the bar-
gainingshareofthehospitalontheconcentrationandmarket
shares of both hospitals and insurers.
In this paper, we employ a traditional empirical
approach in industrial organization research: the structure–
conduct–performance (SCP) approach. The idea is that
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conduct then yields market performance. As a conse-
quence, our analysis is best thought of as an empirical
investigation of the intuitive idea that more concentrated
markets have less price competition.
1 Unfortunately, we do
not currently posses consumer demand data and are limited
to aggregate industry data.
2
The contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, we
analyze the effect of both hospital concentration and
insurer concentration on prices in a period just after the
introduction of price competition in the Netherlands. This
provides valuable insights into the workings of an
‘‘emerging market’’ where market parties have little or no
prior experience with bargaining and selective contracting.
We expect that Dutch market parties will exhibit a steep
learning curve as they adjust their terms over time and
become more astute at balancing the trade-offs in their
efforts to improve their bargaining strength. As time pro-
gresses and more data become available, it will be possible
to model the convergence from short-run price dynamics to
a long-run equilibrium.
Second, we cover a market outside the United States.
Historically, health care in most countries has been pro-
vided through government-owned providers or heavily
regulated private providers. The most notable exception to
this was the US. Along the lines that Cutler [12] calls, the
‘third wave of reform’, market- and incentive-oriented
reforms have been implemented or are being considered in
many countries (for example, Germany, UK, Switzerland,
Sweden and Australia). However, there is not much
empirical evidence on the effects of market reforms outside
the United States. As far as we know, the existing literature
has an exclusive focus on competition in the US, while we
focus on the Netherlands. The institutional design of
competition in the Netherlands is different from the United
States, so that insurers and hospitals operate under more
regulation. In the near future, the competitive segment will
most likely be expanded so that our paper provides a
starting point for studying the interaction between com-
petition and regulation in an emerging market.
Third, we improve the estimation of both Melnick et al.
[29] and the bargaining model based on Brooks et al. [5].
Compared to Melnick et al. [29], we use an exogenous
measure of insurers’ concentration and incorporate the
effects of buyer and seller concentration in a more sym-
metric fashion. In the bargaining model, we improve on the
estimation method by regressing the ‘relative bargaining
share’ instead of the ‘absolute bargaining share’ (thereby
correcting for heteroskedasticity) and by employing a Tobit
regression rather than OLS (taking into account the cen-
sored nature of the dependent variable).
Finally, we use a dataset that contains information about
both contracted prices (i.e. the actual transaction prices)
and the list prices over a number of products for a period of
2 years. To the best of our knowledge, all other papers in
the literature have either list prices or transaction prices,
but not both.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. ‘‘Price com-
petitionbetweenhospitalsintheNetherlands’’,wegivesome
background on the introduction of price competition
between hospitals in the Netherlands. We continue in Sect.
‘‘Literaturereview’’withanoverviewoftheliteratureonthe
estimation of market power and bilateral negotiations. In
Sect.‘‘Themodel’’,wedevelopoureconometricmodels.We
give a description of our dataset in Sect. ‘‘Data’’. In Sect.
‘‘Estimation results’’, we give the results of the estimated
econometric models. Section ‘‘Discussion’’ contains a dis-
cussion of methods and possible extensions. Results of
estimations are summarized in the appendix.
Price competition between hospitals in the Netherlands
The introduction of competition in the Dutch health care
sector has been long debated. The Dutch government plans
a step-by-step introduction of price competition between
hospitals. For a comprehensive overview of the reform
process, we refer to Helderman et al. [25].
The Dutch reforms are based on a mandatory health
insurance system for all Dutch citizens combined with a
model of managed competition for hospitals [16]. The
health insurance package includes primary medical care
and hospital care, but excludes dental and nursing home
care. It involves virtually no co-payments and an optional
deductible (between 0 and 500 Euro). Supplementary
insurance policies (e.g. for dental and cosmetic care) are
optionally available. The mandatory insurance for the basic
beneﬁts package aims at ensuring risk solidarity and uni-
versal health care access for all Dutch citizens.
Themandatoryinsuranceiscomplementedbyamandatory
acceptance by health insurers of all enrollees, without room
for risk selection (i.e. a refusal to insure) or price discrimi-
nation. A sophisticated ex-ante risk adjustment system is in
place to compensate insurance companies for actuarially
predictable health expenditure differentials inducedbysocio-
demographic factors, such as age, sex, income, location and
prior health care consumption (chronic pharmaceutical
dependencies and prior hospitalization). The ex-ante risk
adjustment system levels the playing ﬁeld for health insurers
byenablingpricecompetitiononthepremiumrates(see[34]).
1 To be more precise, competition here is reﬂected in prices (higher
for more concentrated sellers, lower for more concentrated buyers).
2 In the near future, we do expect to obtain complete patient-level
data of the entire Dutch hospital sector, opening the possibilities to go
beyond the reduced form models in this paper.
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place, consisting of both a proportional risk-sharing com-
ponent and an outlier risk-sharing component (see [40]).
These ex-post compensations between proﬁt- and loss-
making health insurers partly dilute the ex-ante incentives
for vigorous price negotiations with health care providers
(for more details, see [30]).
The basic idea behind these reforms is that health
insurers will start ‘managing competition’ between health
care providers by negotiating price discounts from a
selectively contracted network of health care providers. In
this way, insurers can compete for enrollees by offering
health plans that are both attractively priced, but still give a
reasonably broad choice of health care providers.
Two reports by the Dutch Healthcare Authority [9] and
[10]) monitoring the competitive hospital segment, how-
ever, indicated that selective contracting of hospitals has
been virtually non-existent. Rather, most insurers have
been contracting almost every hospital. The main reasons
for this lack of selective contracting are lack of transpar-
ency of quality information, as well as the legal constraints
on using co-payments for out-of-network health care. This
makes patient steering to preferred providers more difﬁcult
because the beneﬁts (higher quality) are not transparent and
there is little ﬁnancial downside for out-of-network care.
Other characteristic features of managed care in the United
States, such as utilization review by health insurers, are
also still in their infancy in the Dutch health care system.
Annual health care expenditures (excluding long-term
care) in the Netherlands for 2005 and 2006 amounted to
approximately €2,000 per capita, half of which were fun-
ded by payroll taxes, the other half being funded by the
insurance premiums. Almost half of the health care
expenditures was on hospital care. Because of the large
share of hospital care in total health care expenditure, the
likely effects of the introduced competition on prices in the
hospital care contracting market are of great interests to
policy makers.
In this paper, we will study the impact of both hospital
and insurer concentration and market shares on Dutch
hospital prices in the competitive segment. Since measures
of concentration or market share require a market deﬁni-
tion, we have to deﬁne the relevant market (as in anti-trust
cases). The relevant market consists of a geographic
dimension and a product dimension. We delineate the
markets for contracting the provision of elective hospital
care using the Elzinga–Hogarty test on patient ﬂow data.
3
The resulting local markets have a rather strong
seller (hospital) concentration with an average HHI of
2,350. The buyer (insurer) concentration on these local
markets is even stronger: all HHIs on the buyers’ side are
above 2,000, with an average of 4,500. These high mea-
sures of buyer concentration can be explained by the his-
torically assigned regional legal monopoly positions of the
local health plans.
The relevant product market can be deﬁned as the set of
all hospital products in the competitive segment. As in
most OECD countries, a product and treatment classiﬁca-
tion is in place in the Netherlands. In 2005, a system of
diagnoses treatment combinations (‘‘DBC’’) was intro-
duced as a simultaneous product and treatment structure.
A DBC ‘includes all activities and services and treatments
associated with a patients demand for care from initial
consultation or examination to ﬁnal check-up’ [34].
In total, approximately 100,000 DBCs have been devel-
oped, of which approximately 33,000 DBCs are used in
practice.
4
The competitive segment is restricted to uncomplicated,
elective care and consists of the more standardized and
frequently performed (surgical) procedures such as cataract
surgery, knee and hip replacements, incontinence surgery
and diabetes care. It consists of 1,376 different DBCs,
which cover 15 (out of 24) different medical specialties and
belong to 28 different diagnoses. See Fig. 1 in the appendix
5%
Incontinence 
 operation
6%
Tonsillectomy
8%
Groin rupture
11% Cataract
12%
Knee 
replacement
12%
Diabetes Mellitus
20%
Hip replacement
26%
Other
Fig. 1 Most frequently performed procedures in the competitive
segment
3 The method of deﬁning relevant markets for health care markets is
not undisputed. See, for example, Gaynor and Vogt [23]. But owing to
lack of data, we were not able to test alternative approaches to
determine geographical markets. This restricted us to base the
estimations on the results of already published analysis by Prismant
[32] based on the Elzinga–Hogarty test.
4 The remaining DBCs are merely theoretical combinations of
diagnoses and treatments.
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123for an overview of the most frequently performed pro-
cedures in the competitive segment. The composition of
the initial version of the competitive segment was partly
based on political reasons such as covering as many
medical specialties as possible and total expenditures not
exceeding 10%. For a more detailed list of the included
procedures, we refer to Dutch Healthcare Authority [9]
and [10].
The revenue of the competitive segment is approxi-
mately 1.1 billion euros, which is about 8% of the total
expenses on hospital care in the Netherlands. To eliminate
the revenue associated with the competitive segment from
the prospective budgets for the regulated segment, the
Dutch Healthcare Authority estimated average unit costs
for the products, based on a survey of a group of 12 hos-
pitals and multiplied these average unit costs with the
estimated volumes (see further in Sect. ‘‘Data’’).
Apart from hospitals, there are also so-called Indepen-
dent Treatment Centers (ZBCs) active in the market for
hospital care. These ZBCs were allowed to enter the
market from 1998. In recent years, the proliferation in the
number of ZBCs has been in contrast to the steady con-
centration of hospitals (see Figs. 2, 3).
The total revenue of the ZBCs was estimated to be 2%
of the competitive segment in 2006 [11]. Most ZBCs were
established as subsidiary branches of hospitals (often on the
same premises), allowing the latter to circumvent the
rationing regime in the regulated segment by shifting
production toward ZBCs (which are exempt from the
budget regime). However, for the competitive segment,
there is no government-imposed volume-rationing and the
incentive to shift production toward ZBCs is absent.
Effectively, ZBCs therefore exercise little competitive
constraint on the prices of the incumbent hospitals in the
competitive segment. Furthermore, we only possess price
from ZBCs in 2006. In the remainder of this paper, we will
exclude ZBCs from our analysis.
Literature review
There is a large amount of literature on the impact of buyer
and seller concentration in health care markets. For good
reviews, see e.g. Dranove and Satterthwaite [15] and
Gaynor and Vogt [23]. Most of the previous literature is
concerned with the exercise of market power on only one
side of the market: either insurers’ monopsony power
or hospitals’ monopoly power. Most studies follow the
structure–conduct–performance (SCP) tradition and esti-
mate a reduced form model in which price or margins
are regressed on control variables (mostly cost and
demand shifters) and a measure of either buyer or seller
concentration.
However, to identify the effects of buyer (seller) con-
centration with monopsony (monopoly) power, speciﬁca-
tion of an underlying structural model is required. The new
empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) models provide
such accurate and direct measures of market power, but the
high standards imposed on the available data and estima-
tion methods can often prevent clean tests of these models.
For example, in competitive markets, price is exogenous,
but in markets with monopoly (monospony) power, price is
endogenous and has to be instrumented for, e.g. with
demand and cost shifters. Furthermore, the proper identi-
ﬁcation of the conduct parameter related to monopoly
(monopsony) power requires a demand (supply) rotator
such as the price of an outside good (or factor prices in
outside industries) in order to instrument for the marginal
demand (supply) appearing in the pricing equation [4].
These requirements are often not fulﬁlled by the data used
in such studies.
There is a large literature on the unilateral impact
of buyer concentration on hospital prices. Examples are
Feldman and Greenberg [18], Adamache and Sloan [1],
Frech [20], and Foreman et al. [19]. These studies analyze
the relationship between the market share of Blue Cross/
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123Blue Shield and the hospital discounts from list prices. All
ﬁnd positive relationships between Blue Cross/Blue Shield
share and provider discounts. However, Staten et al. [36,
37] ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between these variables.
Melnick et al. [29] attribute the insigniﬁcant results of
Staten et al. [36, 37] to the relative inexperience with
selective contracting of the newly formed Blue Cross
Indiana PPO. Using more recent data from the same mar-
ket, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relation between prices
and insurers’ market share.
As alluded to above, the negative relation between pri-
ces and buyers’ concentration as measured by insurers
market share is not necessarily an indication of monopsony
power [23]. Issues such as the market deﬁnition on the
buyer’s side, endogeneity of insurers’ market share with
price and the proper measurement of transaction prices (as
opposed to list prices) have affected most studies to date. In
summary, the bulk of empirical work has been consistent
with the exercise of monopsony power by health insurers
but has not tested the monopsony power hypothesis
directly.
There are also a large number of studies assessing
the unilateral impact of seller concentration on hospital
prices. Examplesa r eN o e t h e r[ 31], Melnick et al. [29],
Dranove et al. [13], Lynk [27], Connor et al. [8],
Simpson and Shin [35], Dranove and Ludwick [14],
Keeler et al. [26], and Lynk and Neumann [28]. These
studies regress hospital price on measure of seller con-
centration (usually a Herﬁndahl–Hirschmann index) and
other control variables. The vast majority of these studies
ﬁnd that hospital concentration increases prices. Again,
as with the impact of buyer concentration, the measured
positive impact of seller concentration on prices has not
directly been identiﬁed with the exercise of monopoly
power by hospitals.
Only Staten et al. [36], Melnick et al. [29] and Gaynor
et al. [21] analyze the bilateral exercise of market power.
However, the ﬁrst study focuses on the concentration of
insurers and, as discussed earlier, has some indeterminate
results. Melnick et al. [29] focuses on the concentration of
hospitals. In both cases, the measurement of the concen-
tration of the other side is not very precise. For example,
Melnick et al. [29] use the Blue Cross market share of the
hospital’s inpatient days as a measure of insurer concen-
tration, rather than the share of Blue Cross in the entire
local market. This measure is therefore endogenous with
hospital price. Gaynor et al. [21] analyze how both hos-
pitals’ and insurers’ concentrations, measured by HHIs on
both sides of the market, are related to the prices. Their
results indicate that increasing concentration of insurers
signiﬁcantly decreases price, while estimation of the effect
of hospital concentration on price does not give any sig-
niﬁcant results.
Another stream of literature directly models the bar-
gaining process between insurers and hospitals. Brooks
et al. [5] consider a potential gain from bargaining divi-
ded by insurers and hospitals and identiﬁes the exercises
of bargaining power by both sides. They specify and
estimate a cooperative Nash-bargaining model of hospi-
tal–insurer bargaining over prices. Their model is inspired
by Svejnar [38], a generalization of the Harsanyi–Nash–
Zeuthen bargaining model. Brooks et al. report that hos-
pitals have relatively more bargaining power (as indicated
by the magnitude of the estimated bargaining parameter)
than insurers. They did not include a measure of insurers’
concentration, although they ﬁnd that a greater enroll-
ment of the population in HMOs has a positive impact on
hospital bargaining power with respect to fee for service
plans. There are some methodological issues with the
study, however, as the authors do not take into account
the censored nature of their dependent variable, raising
concerns for the consistency of their estimation results.
Furthermore, the model of Brooks et al. [5] is one of
bilateral monopoly, rather than a bilateral oligopoly. To
the best of our knowledge, for markets with bilateral
market power, there are no well-speciﬁed generalizations
of the Nash-bargaining model for the bilateral monopoly.
This potentially reduces the applicability of the model of
Brooks et al. [5] to real-word health care markets. Nev-
ertheless, the intuitive results of their paper are very
appealing.
Most of the studies cited earlier were either cross-sec-
tional or panel studies of industry-level data. Brooks et al.
[5] and Gaynor et al. [21] use patient-level data. In the
more recent literature, consumer-choice models have also
been employed to investigate the impact of concentration
on prices. Examples are Town and Vistnes [39] and Capps
et al. [6]. Town and Vistnes equate a hospital’s bargaining
with the value a hospital adds to a network and ﬁnd a
positive impact of bargaining power on prices. Capps et al.
[6] model a similar situation and measure each hospital’s
market power by an aggregation of consumer’s willingness
to pay to the hospital. They ﬁnd a similar positive link
between willingness to pay and prices. Such consumer-
level studies can be used to directly simulate the impact on
prices following hospital mergers, making these models
relevant in anti-trust cases.
The model
SCP-model
SCP-models are based on Chamberlin’s [7] monopolistic
competition theory and seek to explain ﬁrm performance
through market structure conditions, such as number and
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The SCP-hypothesis explains the performance of ﬁrms by
the structure of the market and is based on the premise that
a more concentrated market indicates higher market power
and consequently higher proﬁts for all ﬁrms in the market.
The basic SCP-model can be formulated as follows
(where i is a product, ﬁrm, or time index):
Pi ¼ fðMi;Di;CiÞð 1Þ
where P is a performance measure, M a (set of) market
structure variables, D a (set of) demand variables, and C a
set of ﬁrm/product-speciﬁc control variables. In the health
economics literature, D variables are often referred as
demand shifters and C variables are referred as cost
shifters.
A number of traditional concentration ratios have been
usedasmarket structure indices. Themostcommonindicator
is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index, HHI ¼
Pn
i¼1 MS2
i .I ti s
determinedasasumofsquaredmarketshares.HHIgivesextra
weight to those hospitals that dominate the market. In a
Cournotmodelforhomogenousproducts,theHHIisrelatedto
the industry averaged price–cost margin and buyer demand
elasticity. In SCP-models, price–cost margins are taken from
thedataandconductisalreadydetermined(bytheassumption
of Cournot behavior), so that the coefﬁcient of the HHI
coefﬁcientmeasuresthebuyerdemandelasticity.Instructural
models aimed at measuring market power directly, both
price–cost margins and conduct (i.e. the exercise of market
power) are to be estimated. We lack the necessary data to
directlyestimatetheconductparameter,sothatthecoefﬁcient
of HHI can only serve to back up the intuition that higher
hospital concentration leads to higher prices.
The main equation to be estimated on the basis of per
hospital,perproductandperyeardataisasfollows(whereh,i,
and t index hospitals, insurers, and time, respectively)
5:
ln
ðphit   chÞ
phit
¼ a þ slnðMhiÞþdlnðDiÞ
þ clnðChÞþd   t þ ehit ð2Þ
where as before M is the market share, D represents the
set of variables summarizing demand shifters, and C rep-
resents the set of variables summarizing cost shifters.
Following the main papers in this stream of literature, we
use a log–log transformation of the model to allow for an
easier economic interpretation of the coefﬁcients in terms
of elasticities: by how much does the price–cost margin
increase after a 1% increase in market share?
If we take hospital market share as the only market struc-
ture variable Mhi, then the Cournot oligopoly prediction is
s = 1. In case of perfect competition, an increase in hospital
market share has no impact on performance and s = 0.
Therefore,ininterpretingthecoefﬁcients,wewillfocusonits
sign and signiﬁcance rather than its magnitude.
6
If collusive behavior on the part of sellers exists, then the
impact of hospital market share on performance is more than
proportionalandone wouldexpects[1.Anintuitivewayto
test the hypothesis of coordinated market power (i.e. collu-
sion) against the hypothesis of unilateral market power (i.e.
bargaining power) would be to include both the HHI and the
market share in the regression Eq. 2. If collusion is the dom-
inantdriverbehindprice–costmargins,onewouldexpectthis
to be picked by the coefﬁcient of the HHI, since even small
ﬁrms in concentrated market would proﬁt from the collusion.
If, on the other hand, ﬁrms only exercise their individual
market power, one would expect the coefﬁcient of market
share to prevail.
7 For both sides of the market, we therefore
include both the HHI and the market share in our model.
However, because the HHI can be interpreted as a
weighted average market share (with the weights being
equal to the market shares themselves), the simultaneous
inclusion of both the HHI and market shares as explanatory
variables requires a careful interpretation. While the HHI
and market shares are not directly proportional to each
other for moderately concentrated markets, they almost
coincide for near-monopoly markets. This means that even
though the simultaneous inclusion of the HHI and market
share does not introduce multicollinearity, the potential
nonlinear overlap for highly concentrated markets makes
the unilateral and coordinated effects harder to disentangle.
To this effect, we center the market shares with respect
to the HHI. After this linear transformation of our data, the
coefﬁcient of the centered market share measures the
purely unilateral impact (i.e. bargaining power) of an
above-average market share on market performance.
On the other hand, the net coefﬁcient of the HHI (i.e.
the difference of the coefﬁcient of the HHI itself and the
coefﬁcient of the centered market share) measures the
5 One may argue that the market share variable (M) is not exogenous
in this expression, since there might be a correlation between market
shares of the ﬁrms and the prices they are able to charge. This could
cause an endogeneity problem, which in principle is possible to cure
using the IV techniques (for example, using lagged values of the same
variables—i.e. market shares of 2005). However, in our case
endogeneity is not really severe, since we are considering only the
short run (ﬁrst 2 years after the institutional change) where the
putative reverse relationship between market shares and prices is not
established yet. Moreover, market shares of the hospitals are
calculated based on the data from the regulated segment.
6 A similar interpretation of the regression coefﬁcients is employed in
Bos [3], who studies the effect of concentration in Dutch banking
market on banks’ performance. Bos [3] also provides a formal
theoretical model that connects regression coefﬁcient of market share
(M) to the conjectural variation parameter in Cournot model.
7 The direct analysis of collusion is not possible with our data set and
would also require an underlying structural model. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no existing literature that directly tests the
hypothesis of collusion versus bargaining power.
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123coordinated impact of the market concentration (e.g. col-
lusion) on the price–cost margin.
We stress that the nonlinear relationship between HHI
and market shares necessitates some kind of transformation
between coefﬁcients in order to have a clear interpretation
of unilateral and coordinated effects. For example, without
this centering of the market shares, the unilateral effect is
picked up by the net coefﬁcient of market share (i.e. the
difference of the coefﬁcients for the market share and the
HHI), whereas the coordinated effect would then be iden-
tiﬁed as the coefﬁcient for the HHI. All our results are
robust against such alternative model speciﬁcations. We
chose to center the market shares because the main focus of
our paper is on unilateral bargaining power.
Extension of the SCP-model to estimate effects
of demand-side and supply-side concentration
In this section, we describe the model that can help to
identify the effects of both buyer and seller concentration
on the price of hospital care. We therefore symmetrize
Eq. 2 across insurers and hospitals by including measures
of concentration in both the insurance market and in the
hospital market in the regression Eq. 2 described earlier.
The resulting equation is as follows (where h, i, and t index
hospitals, insurers, and time, respectively):
ln
ðphit   chÞ
phit
¼ a þ slnðMhÞþblnðMiÞþdlnðDiÞ
þ clnðChÞþd   t þ ehit: ð3Þ
Here, the variables Mh and Mi deﬁne measures of the
market structure of the hospitals and insurers in the
relevant hospital care market. Di again is a (set of) demand
shifters (ranging over all insurers), and Ch is a set of
hospital product-speciﬁc control variables (cost shifters).
Our prior hypotheses are that a higher concentration or
market share of hospitals increases price markup, while
insurer concentration or market share decreases the markup
on prices for hospital care, i.e. s[0 and d\0. As in the
previous section, we include both the HHI and the centered
market shares as measures of concentration.
Following Gaynor et al. [21], we like to stress that there is
notheoreticalconsensusonwhatshouldbeastructuralmodel
for a bilateral oligopoly. Therefore, these kinds of models are
based on the intuition that a higher concentration of hospitals
(insurers) would lead to higher (lower) prices.
Hospital–insurer bargaining model
The Svejnar’s [38] generalization of the Harsanyi–Nash–
Zeuthen bargaining model implies that the potential gain
from bargaining is divided among the players so as to
maximize the following expression:
V ¼ð Ui    UiÞ
cðZÞðUj    UjÞ
1 cðZÞ ð4Þ
where Ui and Uj deﬁne utilities from bargaining to players
i and j, respectively. Point ð  Ui;  UjÞ is a disagreement out-
come, i.e. utilities for both players if an agreement is not
reached. c(Z) represents bargaining power of the player as a
function of a set of variables Z, which reﬂects the set of
exogenous characteristics such as market structure.
Brooks et al. [5] discussed an application of this model
to the situation of hospital–insurer bargaining. In their
setup, the hospital and insurer bargain over a discount from
the hospital list price and arrive at a mutually agreed
transaction price. Both the hospital and the insurer are
assumed to be proﬁt maximizers. The bargaining outcome
is the transaction price that maximizes
V ¼ð PH    PHÞ
cðPI    PIÞ
ð1 cÞ ð5Þ
where  PH and  PI are the hospital and insurer disagreement
proﬁt levels, respectively, and ðPH    PHÞ and ðPI    PIÞ
are their corresponding net gains from bargaining.
The net proﬁt (gain) of the insurer can be written:
ðPI    PIÞ¼ð R   K   PNÞ ð R   K   PTNÞð 6Þ
where R is the insurer revenue, K is its cost of production,
P is the contracted price, N is the number of patients
insured by this insurance company and PT is the price the
insurer must pay for an episode of inpatient care if the
insurer has no bargaining power.
8 In our case, we assume
that this monopoly price is equal to the list price.
The net gain of the hospital can be written:
PH    PH ¼½ NðP   CÞ    ½NðPL   CÞ  ð7Þ
where C is the average cost per episode of care, P and N are
as previously deﬁned, and PL the minimum price that the
hospital would accept to provide a privately insured epi-
sode of inpatient care. In our case, this monopsony price is
equal to the average unit cost.
Substituting Eqs. 6 and 7 into Eq. 5 and maximizing the
resulting equation with respect to P yields:
P ¼ cPT þð 1   cÞPL: ð8Þ
From this, we see that the negotiated price is a weighted
combination of the monopoly and monopsony prices, with
the bargaining power as the weight. We can solve this
equation for the bargaining power:
8 PT, the price that the insurer pays for an episode of inpatient care if
the insurer has no bargaining power can also be viewed as the
maximum price that can be asked by the hospital in case it has
monopoly power in the relevant market. This price represents the
upper bound of the interval of gains from trade between hospital and
insurer. We believe that the list price in our sample can be a good
approximation for this upper bound of the gains from trade, since the
list price represents the price that can be asked by the hospital from a
consumer who does not have an option to bargain for a reduced price.
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P   PL
PT   PL
: ð9Þ
Note that PT - PL is the potential absolute gain (in
euro’s) from bargaining to be divided between the hospital
and the insurer, and P - PL is the margin gained by the
hospital. The measure of relative bargaining share, c, is the
share of the potential gain that a hospital keeps as a result
of bargaining. If c equals one, the hospital has complete
bargaining power. On the other hand, if c equals zero, the
insurer has complete bargaining power and is able to
extract a maximum discount from the hospital.
To explore how bargaining power is inﬂuenced by
observable exogenous characteristics Z, we can parame-
terize c:
P   PL
PT   PL
¼ð a þ bZÞ: ð10Þ
If b equals zero, then a equals c. In this case, bargaining
power does not vary with Z. When c is zero, perfect
competition exists (insurers are able to extract all rents).
When c is one, the hospital uses monopoly pricing
(suppliers are able to extract all rents). The Nash-
bargaining solution is represented by a c of 0.5.
The model Eq. 10 resembles the model of Brooks et al.
[5]. However, they estimated the absolute gain from bar-
gaining rather than the relative gain from bargaining,
thereby introducing heteroskedasticity, since a larger hos-
pital with average bargaining power will have both a higher
absolute gain and a higher margin. Moreover, the estima-
tion of the empirical counterparts to Eqs. 8 and 9 require
data on contracted prices P, estimates of PL and PT, and
data on exogenous factors, Z, that are theoretically related
to the bargaining power underlying each transaction. Since
the bargaining power has to lie within the unit interval,
ordinary least squares is an inconsistent estimation method
and censored regression techniques (such as a Tobit
regression) have to be employed.
For the empirical estimation of the model described by
Eq. 10, we use the same covariates as in the estimation of
Eq. 3:
ðphit   chÞ
ðlht   chÞ
¼ a þ slnðMhÞþblnðMiÞþdlnðDiÞ
þ clnðChÞþd   t þ ehit ð11Þ
Here, we have denoted the list price with lht.
9
Data
Data sources
In this section, we describe the various data sources that we
employed for our estimations. Table 1 shows the different
sources.
Per DBC, we have three price-related components: the
average total costs, the contracted price, and the list price
(i.e. the price that uninsured patients and patients from non-
contracted insurers have to pay). We also have estimates of
the associated volumes per DBC.
Because of the administrative difﬁculties associated
with the newly introduced DBC-system, many hospitals
were not yet able to calculate their own average total costs.
We therefore used cost data from a sample of 12 so-called
front-runner hospitals to estimate the average cost per
DBC.
10
The DBC-volumes in 2004 for the 12 ‘‘front-runner’’
hospitals were used to translate the number of admissions
in 2004 (an administrative measure used in the previous
registration system) into estimates for the DBC-volumes in
2005. This translation is done using a three-step multipli-
cative imputation procedure. First, we know per insurer–
hospital pair, the number of days of stay in the regulated
segment as well as the total number of days of stay per
hospital in the regulated segment. This allows us to com-
pute for each hospital the market share of each insurer in
the number of days of stay in the regulated segment.
Second, we have for each hospital–diagnosis pair the
number of inpatient and initial outpatient admissions in the
competitive segment. Since each DBC can by law contain
only one inpatient admission or one initial outpatient
admission per episode, we can extrapolate the relation
between admissions and DBCs for the 12 front-runner
hospitals to obtain estimates of volumes per hospital–DBC
pair for all remaining hospitals. Third, we multiply these
volumes by the hospital–insurer market shares to obtain
estimates of volumes per hospital–insurer–DBC combina-
tion. We currently do not possess the actually realized
DBC-volumes of 2005 or 2006 for hospitals that did not
take part in the ‘‘front-runner’’ data collection.
Contracted prices were submitted by health insurers.
Some smaller insurers did not or could not supply all their
contracted prices. Since it is hard to distinguish between
DBCs that were not contracted at all and contracts that
were closed but not submitted, we cannot make deﬁnite
statements about the coverage of our database. However,
from background interviews with hospitals and health
9 Unfortunately, the interpretation of the model with log-transformed
variables on the RHS is more difﬁcult. So we cannot really compare
the magnitude of the coefﬁcients of the two above-described models
(only can make comparisons of their sign and signiﬁcance). Another
alternative would be to rescale the variable on the LHS and do the
usual OLS of the log-linear model, where coefﬁcients can be
interpreted in terms of elasticities.
10 These 12 ‘‘front-runner’’ hospitals give a fairly representative
sample of the total 98 hospitals and are not systematically different
from the rest in terms of size or volumes of production.
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123insurers [9], we learned that in 2005 most insurers con-
tracted almost every hospital for their entire range of
product. As the 10 largest insurers submitted approxi-
mately 95% of their contracted prices, we estimate to have
about 75% of all contract prices in our database. Virtually,
all hospitals complied with the mandatory supply of list
prices to Dutch Healthcare Authority. Hospitals are also
obliged to post these list prices on publicly accessible
places such as in waiting rooms or on their website.
In principle, average total costs are expected to be lower
than contracted prices, which in turn should lie below the
list prices. However, in our database, we observe all six
possible permutations from the expected pattern. Con-
tracting below average unit costs (4.5% of our sample) can
occur because hospitals offer cost-heterogeneous but
medically related DBC-packages for a single-price (e.g. all
DBCs related to a single diagnosis). Above list price con-
tracting (9.1% of all observations) also occur, possibly
because insurers with a small but non-negligible revenue
share might not have enough bargaining power to get much
of a reduction from the list price. However, they still might
want to contract the hospital to avoid the expensive
administrative task of processing insurance claims from
individual consumers. These extra administrative costs
might induce a willingness to pay toward the hospital that
lies slightly above the list price. Other explanations for
such odd patterns in the price data might be administrative
difﬁculties with the relatively new DBC-system, and the
inexperience in the bargaining process.
We treat these data problems by performing a multi-
variate outlier analysis, along the lines of Hadi [24]. Fur-
thermore, for the remaining observations with transaction
price below cost or above the list price, we use the following
censoring procedure. When price is below cost, we conclude
thatthehospitalhasnobargainingpower.Whenpriceisabove
thelistprice,includingtheratherbewilderingsequenceoflist
price\contractedprice\averageunitcosts,weconcludethat
the hospital has all the bargaining power. This is equal to the
treatmentinTable 1ofBrooksetal.[5].Finally,weaggregate
theprice–costmarginsandbargainingshareacrossallhospital
products to an overall price–cost margin and bargaining. The
levelofanalysisisthereforeall1,235uniquehospital–insurers
pairs for a period of 2 years.
Market concentration and market shares
In the near future, as the DBC-system will overcome the
early administrative difﬁculties, more complete micro-level
data will become available, including average unit costs
from all hospitals and zipcode locations of patients.
However, since our current dataset does not contain such
micro-level data, we were unable to determine the relevant
product and geographic market from ﬁrst principles.
On behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Health, a private
company (Prismant) [32] performed such a market analysis
based on micro-level data from the previous medical reg-
istration system. There are two important dimensions for
the relevant market: the product market deﬁnition and the
geographic market deﬁnition. Prismant distinguishes the
following product markets for hospital care:
• Acute care versus elective care
• Inpatient care versus outpatient care
• Uncomplicated care versus complicated care.
Table 1 Data sources that were employed for estimations
Information Source (years) Remarks
Estimated average unit costs and volumes
per DBC in the competitive segment
Dutch Healthcare Authority (2004) Information submitted by a sample of 12
hospitals. The associated revenues have been
subtracted from the hospital budgets in the
regulated segment
Contract prices per DBC Dutch Healthcare Authority [9, 10] Information submitted by health insurers
(coverage 75% of the national market)
List prices per DBC Dutch Healthcare Authority [9, 10] Information submitted by hospitals (almost
complete coverage)
Relevant geographic markets for hospitals Prismant B.V. (2004) Elzinga–Hogarty test applied to hospital
and patient zipcode locations
National market shares of health insurers Vektis (2005) Information submitted by health insurers
for the risk adjustment system
Mutual shares of hospitals and insurers
in each other’s portfolios
CTZ (2004) Based on the number of nursing days bought by
the public health insurers, rescaled to include
private insurers
CTZ was the Health Insurers Regulator and merged in October 2006 with the Dutch Healthcare Regulator into the Dutch Healthcare Authority
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uncomplicated, elective care.
We used published market share data based on patient
ﬂows (Elzinga–Hogarty (EH) test [32]).
11 This test takes a
geographic market to be the area in which most citizens
consume locally produced healthcare, and where locally
produced healthcare is also mostly consumed by local
citizens. The determination of geographic market by the
EH-test has been subject to a lot of research and debate.
For an overview of the method and the debate, we refer to
Gaynor and Vogt [22] and to the FTC/DOJ report [17].
The results from the Prismant analysis include for every
hospital in our database a list of hospitals that are in the
same geographic market, and for all these hospitals, their
market share in the relevant product market of uncompli-
cated, elective care. The resulting market shares have been
used to compute the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index of mar-
ket concentration for each geographic hospital market.
From another private data source (Vektis 2004), we
obtain the local market shares of health insurers. We
combine these data with the distribution of contracted
health care per hospital over the various health insurers,
which are obtained from a database by CTZ. This dataset
contains the number of nursing days per hospital each
insurer bought in the regulated segment.
To avoid issues of endogeneity in our estimation, we use
the market shares of insurers per hospital in the regulated
segment (where prices are ﬁxed) as instruments for the
relative shares of insurers per hospital in the competitive
segment (where prices are negotiable). From these exoge-
nous measures, we computed the relative shares of insurers
in the estimated DBC-volumes obtained from the ﬁrst data
source in Table 1, and subsequently the HHI of insurers
within the geographic hospital market.
In our models, we simultaneously include the HHI and
the market share of hospitals and insurers. To cleanly
separate the unilateral and the coordinated effect of market
shares on prices, we ﬁrst center the market shares toward a
zero mean by subtracting the HHI.
All in all, we have the following variable indicating
market concentration and market share:
• the HHI of hospitals in the relevant market
• the HHI of insurers in the relevant market
• the centered market share of a hospital in the relevant
market
• the centered market share of an insurer in the relevant
market.
Following Melnick et al. [29], we also interact market
share with concentration to capture possible diminishing
effects of competing ﬁrms on a given ﬁrms market power.
We construct 4 dummy variables that divide the HHI along
the levels of 2,000; 3,333; and 5,000.
Control variables
From our basic database, we construct the following
demand and cost shifters. To capture demand shifters, we
construct indicators for the relative importance of the
competitive segment for a speciﬁc hospital or insurer. For a
hospital, this is calculated as the ratio between the revenue
of the competitive segment and the regulated segment. For
insurers, this is calculated as the revenue of the insurer in a
local hospital market compared to its national turnover. We
also include dummies labeling the different geographic
areas (provinces), and we ﬁnally also include a dummy to
capture possible time effects. To avoid the basic dummy
variable trap, we use the general hospitals, the province of
Zuid-Holland and the year 2005 as the reference groups in
the regressions.
As cost shifters, we include the following variables.
First, we include dummies for hospital type (general hos-
pitals, tertiary care hospitals, and teaching hospitals).
Second, we compute a proxy for casemix of the hospital
production. Normally, a casemix index is created by cal-
culating the ratio between (total) expenditures and the
number of patients. Since we do not have data on the
number of patients in the competitive segment, we ﬁrst
calculated the unit cost of an average DBC as the ratio
between the aggregate DBC-expenditures (DBC-volumes
priced and average unit cost) and the aggregate DBC-vol-
ume and index this variable such that the national average
is 100. We also construct size indicators that might capture
economies of scale for a speciﬁc hospital or insurer. For a
hospital, this is calculated as total the revenue of the
competitive and regulated segment combined. For insurers,
this is calculated as its national total of nursing days.
We log transformed most of our continuous variables
(except for the bargaining share, the casemix index, and the
importance measures) since preliminary regressions indi-
cated that the residuals of the linear model were charac-
terized by a much skewed distribution.
12 Furthermore, the
log–log transformation of our model allows the interpre-
tation of the inﬂuence of market concentration on prices in
terms of elasticities.
11 Their analysis is based on micro-level data from the previous
medical registration and performed for different product markets. We
used the analysis for uncomplicated, elective, care products. The
Prismant analysis is based on patient locations indexed by zipcode
areas. For some metropolitan areas, we had to correct these results for
adjacent hospitals located in the same zipcode area, which would
otherwise result in completely overlapping geographic markets.
12 Formal diagnostic testing with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and
Shapiro–Wilk tests rejected the null-hypothesis of normally distrib-
uted residuals of the linear model speciﬁcation.
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123Estimation results
Estimation of the SCP-model
As a performance measure in the SCP-model, we use a
price markup derived from the price and cost data as a ratio
of list price less estimated costs to list price. See Table 2
that provides an overview of descriptive statistics. The
average price–cost margin in our sample was 6.5%.
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and
explanatory variables that have been discussed in Sect.
‘‘Market concentration and market shares’’ are also pro-
vided in Table 2.
For the estimation of the SCP-model, we regressed
price–cost margins on indicators of industry performance
and on the set of explanatory variables using OLS regres-
sion. The estimation results are summarized in the column
Model I of Table 3. The model explains 28% of the vari-
ation of the price–cost margin. We rejected the hypothesis
that we omitted variables (using the Ramsey’s RESET
test).
13
The model also indicates that the concentration mea-
sures have the expected signs. Similarly to Melnick et al.
[29], the concentration of hospitals (insurers) has a sig-
niﬁcant positive (negative) impact on the price–cost
markup that hospitals are able to charge for their products
in the competitive domain. Furthermore, teaching hospitals
are able to charge signiﬁcantly higher price–cost margins
than general hospitals, as they get about 14% higher
markups than general hospitals. See Table 3.
Interestingly, the estimation of SCP-version of the
model suggests that the coefﬁcients for the HHI on the
hospital’s and insurer’s market are almost identical to
the coefﬁcients for their centered market shares.
14 This
means that the net impact of the HHI on either side of the
market is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. As we
conjectured in Sect. ‘‘The model’’, this might indicate that
there is no coordinated market power present in our data
set. Intuitively, the estimation results suggest that only
unilateral market power is being exercised since higher
market shares rather than a higher HHI inﬂuence the price–
cost margins. It would be interesting for future research to
construct a structural model that can cleanly distinguish
between coordinated and unilateral market power.
Since our results indicate that market structure has only
weak (though signiﬁcant) impact on price–cost margins in
the competitive segment of hospital care, the implications
for the welfare effects of e.g. hospitals’ or insurers’
mergers are to be interpreted rather carefully. For a merger
of 2 out of 5 equally sized hospitals (insurers), we predict a
modest 1,5% price increase (decrease), whereas the pre-
dicted price–cost difference for a merger of 2 out of 3
equally sized market parties would amount to about 1.8%.
Estimation of the hospital–insurer bargaining model
For estimation of hospital-insurer bargaining model, we
constructed a dependent variable denoting the bargaining
share of the hospital. It is deﬁned as the relative location of
the contracted price on the interval between the estimated
average unit costs and the list price for non-insured con-
sumers.
15 In other words, it is determined as a fraction of
the total gains from trade between hospitals and insures
that goes to hospitals. The average share a hospital gets
from the total gains of trade is 47% (see Table 2). This
would mean that on average the insurers have slightly more
bargaining power, if we can reject the hypothesis that
hospitals and insurers reach the Nash-bargaining solution
of 0.5 (see Sect. ‘‘Hospital–insurer bargaining model’’ for
theoretical background). Following a formal t-test based on
our data, we reject the hypothesis that hospitals and
insurers reached a Nash-bargaining solution.
It should also be stressed that this dependent variable is
limited between 0 and 1 by construction (see Sect.
‘‘Data’’). This structure of the dependent variable calls for
application of limited dependent variable econometric
techniques, rather than the ordinary least squares tech-
niques of Brooks et al. [5]. The hospital–insurer bargaining
model is estimated using the censored regression Tobit
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
Price–cost markup 1.065 0.052 0.832 1.351
Hospital’s bargaining share 0.474 0.293 0.000 1.000
HHI hospitals 0.250 0.156 0.071 0.914
HHI insurers 0.466 0.149 0.241 0.812
Market share hospital 0.267 0.191 0.022 0.956
Market share insurer 0.013 0.044 0.000 0.760
Relative importance for hospital 0.117 0.020 0.055 0.167
Relative importance for insurer 0.049 0.116 0.000 0.862
Hospital size 0.866 0.473 0.301 2.183
Insurer size 1.391 0.942 0.080 3.130
Casemix index 1.010 0.019 0.971 1.076
All variables except hospital’s bargaining share are log transformed
13 A similar result was obtained by Melnick et al. [29].
14 In a regression with on the RHS b1 * HHI ? b2 * (market share—
HHI), the net impact of the HHI is (b1 - b2) * HHI. In our
estimation, b1 does not signiﬁcantly differ from b2, so the net impact
of the HHI is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
15 For more formal representation, see expression (9).
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bargaining model in the column Model II in Table 3.
From these results, we conclude that a higher concen-
tration of the HHI of insurers leads to a signiﬁcant increase
in the insurer’s bargaining share. This impact of insurer
concentration is purely picked up by the insurers HHI, with
no signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the centered market share.
This would suggest that insurers bargain in a somewhat
coordinated way with hospitals since a higher HHI on the
insurer market leads to a higher bargaining share for the
insurers. This ﬁnding is consistent with the institutionalized
historical practice of collective insurer bargaining in the
regulated segment.
For hospitals, however, only the centered market share
has a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, but with a negative sign. We
interpret this at ﬁrst sight counter-intuitive result as fol-
lows. The net coefﬁcient of the hospital HHI (i.e. the dif-
ference of the coefﬁcients for the hospital market HHI and
Table 3 Estimation results
Model I: SCP-model (OLS regression) Model II: Bargaining model (Tobit regression)
Coefﬁcient Std. error Coefﬁcient Std. error
HHI hospitals 0.015*** 0.005 -0.048 0.037
HHI insurers -0.015* 0.008 -0.115* 0.061
Centered market share hospital 0.014*** 0.004 -0.115*** 0.032
Centered market share insurer -0.014*** 0.005 0.033 0.035
Interaction of hospital’s market share in local market
With HHI hospitals (\0.2) -0.009** 0.004 0.050* 0.030
With HHI hospitals (0.2–0.33) -0.007 0.004 0.048 0.033
With HHI hospitals (0.33–0.5) -0.003 0.005 0.078** 0.039
Interaction of insurer’s market share in local market
With HHI insurers (0.2–0.33) 0.004 0.005 -0.083** 0.034
With HHI insurers (0.33–0.5) 0.003 0.005 -0.108*** 0.035
With HHI insurers ([0.5) 0.005 0.005 -0.103*** 0.036
Relative importance for hospital -0.249*** 0.087 -0.454 0.643
Relative importance for insurer 0.036** 0.014 0.285*** 0.106
Hospital size -0.005 0.005 0.042 0.038
Insurer size 0.013*** 0.002 0.076*** 0.013
Teaching hospital 0.137*** 0.014 0.166 0.102
Tertiary care 0.002 0.005 0.054 0.034
Casemix index 0.140* 0.072 -0.501 0.527
Regional dummies
Groningen -0.001 0.007 -0.111** 0.052
Friesland 0.036*** 0.007 0.166*** 0.053
Drenthe -0.013** 0.006 0.172*** 0.048
Overijssel -0.006 0.006 -0.120*** 0.046
Gelderland 0.022*** 0.005 0.019 0.037
Limburg -0.020*** 0.006 0.116*** 0.045
Noord-Holland -0.004 0.004 0.013 0.031
Utrecht -0.012* 0.007 0.116** 0.051
Noord-Brabant 0.010** 0.005 0.049 0.034
Zeeland -0.006 0.008 -0.044 0.059
Flevoland 0.020** 0.009 0.317*** 0.070
Year==2005 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.084*** 0.018
Constant -0.165 0.141 -1.208 1.032
Adjusted R2 0.28
Pseudo R2 0.29
All continuous variables are log transformed
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively
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123the hospital market share) is signiﬁcantly positive. This
would suggest that hospitals also coordinate their bar-
gaining with insurers. However, this coordinated bargain-
ing power is signiﬁcantly adjusted downward by the
hospital’s own market share. This interpretation is consis-
tent with the fact that smaller hospitals proﬁt more from the
coordinated bargaining than larger hospitals.
On average, teaching hospitals are able to obtain a better
market outcome as they get about 17% more of the bar-
gaining share than general hospitals. But the regression
coefﬁcient for the teaching dummy is not signiﬁcant. This
implies that although academic hospitals are able to charge
signiﬁcantly higher prices, they do bargain not signiﬁcantly
better compared to other types of hospitals.
Estimation of idiosyncratic effects in the bargaining
process
As Melnick et al. [29] observe based on papers describing
the situation in California just after the introduction of
competition in hospital care, the market might not be in a
long-run equilibrium. This suggests that idiosyncratic
effects such as the bargaining skills of the individuals at the
negotiating table rather than structural conditions such as
the outside options might have a sizeable impact on the
market outcomes. However, direct inclusion of ﬁxed
effects per hospital and insurer in our model did not
improve our initial estimation results (because of the severe
reduction in degrees of freedom). To test this hypothesis,
we therefore performed ordinary least squares regression of
the residuals of our initial regression on hospital- and
insurer-speciﬁc dummies. Using an ANOVA, we found
that various ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummies were jointly signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero. See Table 4.
We ﬁnd that in the SCP-model approximately 28% of
the residual variation can be explained by idiosyncratic
effects of the individual hospitals and insurers, 11% by
insurer-speciﬁc effects and 17% by hospital speciﬁc
effects.
We also perform an ANOVA on the residuals of our
initial regression. See Table 4. We ﬁnd that approximately
41% of the residual variation of the bargaining model can
be explained by idiosyncratic effects, 12% by insurer-
speciﬁc effects and 29% by hospital speciﬁc effects.
Summary of results
The results of the SCP-model presented in the Sect.
‘‘Estimation of the SCP-model’’ imply that the market
shares of hospitals (insurers) have a signiﬁcantly positive
(negative) impact on the hospital price–cost margin, i.e.
only an organization’s market share matters in terms of
price negotiations rather than HHI per se. Furthermore,
teaching hospitals are able to charge a signiﬁcantly higher
price–cost margins than general hospitals as they get about
14% higher markups than general hospitals.
The results of the bargaining model presented in the
Sect. ‘‘Estimation of the hospital–insurer bargaining
model’’ imply a signiﬁcant negative effect of insurer con-
centration on the bargaining share, but no signiﬁcant effect
of hospital concentration on the division of the gains from
bargaining. The average share a hospital gets from the total
gains of trade is 47%. This would mean that on average the
insurers have slightly more bargaining power. Academic
hospitals again are able to charge signiﬁcantly higher pri-
ces, but they do not signiﬁcantly better bargain, compared
to other types of hospitals.
In summary, we ﬁnd that a larger supply-side concen-
tration leads to signiﬁcantly higher price–cost margins for
hospitals and that a larger demand-side concentration has a
signiﬁcant downward effect on hospital’s margins in the
Netherlands. Moreover, we ﬁnd that stronger hospital
concentration does not lead to a signiﬁcantly higher bar-
gaining share for hospitals, whereas a larger concentration
of insurers does have a signiﬁcant downward effect on the
bargaining share for hospitals. Also in both models, we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant impact of idiosyncratic effects on the market
outcomes.
Discussion
In this paper, we estimate the impact of concentration and
bargaining power on the negotiation results in the ﬁrst
2 years after the institutional change in the Dutch hospital
sector. This is one of the few empirical studies that
investigates the bargaining process between insurers and
hospitals, just after the introduction of a market-oriented
reform.
Since we model the bargaining process just after an
institutional change, the data base is not always very good.
We do not possess individual hospital data on costs. We
cannot make deﬁnite statement about the coverage of our
database on contracted prices and the data show sometime
odd patterns. We have tried to mitigate the effect of these
Table 4 Idiosyncratic effects in the residual variance
Model I:
SCP-model
Model II:
Bargaining model
Idiosyncratic effects in
the residual variance
(ANOVA R2)
Hospital
effects
Hospital
effects
0.17 0.29
Insurer effects 0.11 0.28 0.12 0.41
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and by censoring the data.
As a ﬁrst model, we use a traditional structure–conduct–
performance model (SCP-model) along the lines of
Melnick et al. [29] for estimation of the effects of buyer
and seller concentration on price markups. Second, we
model the interaction between hospitals and insurers in the
context of a generalized bargaining model [5].
We realize the general problem of endogeneity that
arises when estimating SCP-models. However, we partly
overcome this limitation and improve the estimation by
instrumenting market shares of hospitals and insurers in the
regression equations estimated for both models. In partic-
ular, we instrument market shares of hospitals by lagged
market shares and insurers’ market shares are instrumented
by market shares of insurers in the regulated segment.
Further we noticed that in both estimated models, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of idiosyncratic effects on the
market outcomes. This is consistent with the fact that the
Dutch hospital sector is not yet in a long-run equilibrium.
The institutional design of the hospital market in the
Netherlands is in many ways similar to that in the United
States.
16 There are, however, some important differences.
First, US citizens are not obliged to have health insurance,
and second, US insurers do not have a mandatory accep-
tance for any patient at community rating. Finally, almost
the entire hospital sector (at least for privately insured
patients) has been without direct price regulation for sev-
eral decades. The stakes in bargaining between insurers and
hospitals are therefore currently far greater in the US than
in the Netherlands, and US market parties have had more
time than their Dutch counterparts to reach a long-run
equilibrium.
Since our results indicate that market structure has only
weak (though signiﬁcant) impact on price–cost margins in
the competitive segment of hospital care, the implications
for the welfare effects of e.g., hospital or insurers mergers
are to be interpreted rather carefully.
Our results from the SCP-model seem to indicate that
the negotiations were not coordinated between either the
hospitals or insurers. However, the bargaining model sug-
gests some coordination between both hospitals and
insurers. Our estimated models do not allow us to draw any
hard conclusions on the distinction between coordinated
and unilateral effects.
We expect to have more and better data in the future.
Especially, we expect to gather data on the treatment vol-
umes and patient-level data (some characteristics like sex,
age, diagnosis, and zip-code), which will allow us to extend
the estimated models along the lines of Capps et al. [6] and
Antwi et al. [2]. These approaches will allow us to estimate
a structural model of hospital competition. These structural
models might also allow us to better distinguish between
coordinated and unilateral market power.
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